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ABSTRACT
Motor carrier safety is a topic of great importance for both industry and makers of public policy.
Regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), regularly publish
data detailing the circumstances surrounding roadway accidents.  FMCSA’s Large Truck and Bus Crash
Facts (LTBCF) data demonstrate an increase in accidents during daylight hours and on weekdays.
Roadway risks are ever-present but differ by time of day and day of the week.  These differences may
potentially engender crashes of different severities at different times.  This study analyzes FMCSA LTBCF
data to determine when crashes of different severities are more likely to occur.  Findings indicate that
crashes resulting in property damage are more likely to occur during the day and on weekdays. However,
fatal and injury crashes are significantly more likely during nights and weekends.  Recommendations to
improve safety outcomes are provided along with suggestions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
The trucking industry is crucial to US economic
success.  Over 70% of the nation’s freight moves by
truck (Trucking.org, 2017) and trucking
expenditures exceed that of the other four transport
modes combined (CSCMP, 2017). Given trucking’s
size and importance, it comes as no surprise that a
great deal of past research has been devoted to the
industry.  This research can be summarized into
three overarching areas:  operations and technology,
people, and regulatory compliance.
A review of the literature based on the operations
and technology perspective indicates that the
majority of the research in this area has focused on
topics such as carrier management (Hada and
Kleiner, 2000; Overstreet, Hanna, Byrde, Cegielski
and Hazen, 2013); cost control (Grimm, Corsi and
Jarrell, 1989; Thomas and Callan, 1992); carrier
productivity (Weber and Weber, 2004; Han, Corsi,
and Grimm, 2008; Boyer and Burks, 2009;
Villarreal, Garza-Reyes and Kumar, 2016); survival
techniques (Grimm, Corsi and Smith, 1993; Voss,
Cangelosi, Rubach and Nadler, 2011); and the
adoption of technology (Cantor, Corsi and Grimm,
2006; Keller, 2006; Cantor, Corsi and Grimm,
2009).  People oriented motor carrier research has
generally focused on truck driver management and
retention (Mejza, Barnard, Corsi and Keane, 2003;
Mello and Hunt, 2009; Nadler and Kros, 2014),
driver ethics (Douglas and Swartz, 2017),
workplace violence (Anderson, 2004), the use of
medical marijuana (Stringham, Allard, Knapp and
Minor, 2017); and driver health (Lemke and
Apostolopoulos, 2015; Hilliard, 2016; Olson,
Wipfli, Thompson, Elliot, Anger, Bodner, Hammer
and Perrin, 2016).
Interestingly, regulatory aspects of the motor carrier
industry have received little recent research
attention. Research in this area can be further
divided into two time frames: pre-2000 and the
impact of deregulation (Daicoff, 1988; Corsi,
Grimm, Smith and Smith, 1992; Jerman and
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Anderson, 1994) and post 2000 (motor carrier
safety/security).  Safety/security studies of interest
include hours of service (Saltzman and Belzer,
2002), regulatory compliance (Flatow, 2000), the
adoption of safety processes (Huang, Jeffries,
Tolbert and Dainoff, 2017); and motor carrier
security (Chang and Wu, 2015; Boone, Skipper,
Murfield and Murfield, 2016).
Given the breadth and depth of the motor carrier
literature, most investigations of temporal factors
associated with safety have been limited to Federal
and state-level studies.  No recent business logistics
articles of which we are aware examine accident
probabilities and the temporal factors associated
with safety incidents. Studies exist related to the
temporal dimensions of motor carrier safety but few
academic articles in the business logistics space
analyze available data or offer useful conclusions to
motor carrier managers.  For instance, the subject
of motor carrier safety, as it relates to nights and
weekends, was hotly debated during recent
discussions related to federal hours of service
(HOS) regulations (FMCSA, 2017).  This debate
centered around a 2013 update to HOS regulations
that limited drivers’ ability to restart their 60/70 hour
clock.  This was accomplished by limiting drivers to
one “34-hour restart” every 168 hours and dictating
that this restart must include two nighttime periods
including the hours of 1AM to 5AM.  These
provisions were eventually stricken in part due to
trucking industry arguments that they forced drivers
to operate in rush-hour traffic, which increases
congestion and safety risk.  Second order impacts
with unintended consequences often occur when
new regulations are implemented and the cost/
benefits of these now repealed regulations are hotly
debated.
Of course, risks occur more frequently when a
subject is exposed to risk factors.  In a roadway
safety context, crash frequency is positively
correlated with miles driven and traffic congestion
(Knipling, 2009).  Mileage and traffic congestion
are greater during weekday, daylight hours (Hendrix
2002; ATRI 2014).  However, other factors
increase risk while driving on weekends and nights,
when roadways are populated with a larger number
of impaired automobile drivers (Knipling, 2009).
The National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration (NHTSA, 2017) reported
automobile drivers were impaired by alcohol in 27%
of fatal light vehicle crashes.
Thankfully, most crashes are not fatal. Crashes are
usually less severe and result in injury and/or
property damage. However, no business logistics
work of which we are aware assesses crash severity
risk (e.g. fatal, injury, or property damage only) by
time of day (e.g. day v. night) or day of the week
(e.g. weekday v. weekend).  This study draws from
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) data to explore the frequency and
probability of fatal, injury, or property damage
crashes by day of the week and time of day.
This study begins with a review of relevant literature
related to motor carrier safety.  The authors then
discuss the methodology used to explore differences
in crash severity by examining temporal factors.
Results are subsequently presented. The authors
then suggest implications for managers and how they
may use study findings to improve safety
performance. Limitations and implications for future
research are presented followed by concluding
remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Motor vehicle crashes are an unfortunate reality in
modern society.  NHTSA (2017) reported that U.S.
roadway accidents killed 37,461 people in 2016, an
increase of 5.6% over 2015.   Of those killed, only
4,317 (11.5%) resulted from an accident involving a
large truck, and vehicles other than the truck are
predominantly at fault in these fatal incidents
(FMCSA, 2007). These statistics highlight the
importance of government and private investments
in roadway safety.
Investments in roadway safety are made in order to
mitigate the severe economic, physical, and
psychological harm caused by these incidents.
NHTSA (2014) calculated that motor vehicle
crashes cost the United States $871 billion a year.
This includes $277 billion in economic costs and
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$594 billion from death, pain, and suffering.  The
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA, 2008) found that the cost of an accident
involving a large truck ranged between $334,892
and $7,633,600.  Given the high cost of safety
incidents, it is incumbent upon the motor carrier
industry to understand the conditions under which
most crashes occur.  Most truck crashes occur on
weekdays during daylight hours in clear conditions
on dry roads (Knipling, 2009).  There are three
primary risk factors contributing to motor vehicle
crashes: enduring driver characteristics (e.g. age,
medical conditions, and susceptibility to fatigue),
temporary driver characteristics (amount of sleep,
illness, or moodiness that may lead to aggressive
actions), and situational factors (e.g. traffic
congestion, weather, and maintenance problems)
(Knipling, 2009).  These factors are important
whether or not a truck is involved in the incident but,
given the skill required to operate a commercial
motor vehicle, their impact may be more
pronounced when incidents involve a truck.
Time of day and day of the week are related to each
of these factors.  Driver fatigue more commonly
manifests itself at night (Massie, Blower and
Campbell, 1997) and may result from enduring or
temporary driver characteristics.  Some people are
naturally more susceptible to fatigue and may have
medical conditions, such as sleep apnea, that
contribute to fatigued driving.  Fatal fatigue related
truck crashes generally involve only the offending
truck, which frequently leaves the road (Massie,
Blower and Campbell, 1997).  Traffic congestion is
more common during the day, particularly during
weekday rush hours, and is positively related to the
occurrence of safety incidents (Hendrix, 2002) as
85% of truck crashes involve other vehicles;
overwhelmingly cars (Knipling, 2009).  While night
and weekend roads are less congested, they are
more likely to be populated by impaired drivers.
The Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS),
undertaken as a collaboration between FMCSA
and NHTSA, examined 1,000 large truck crashes
between 2001 and 2003 and found that alcohol was
used by 9.0% of car drivers but only 0.3% of truck
drivers (FMCSA, 2007).  Hendrix (2002) found
the incidence of fatal light vehicle accidents begin
rising at 10PM and peaked around 3AM.
Knipling’s (2009) motor carrier safety textbook
posits that government and academic research have
neglected the importance of exposure data (e.g.
number and timing of miles driven) when assessing
roadway travel risk. The aforementioned literature
demonstrates that different risks occur at different
times and on different days.  Drivers choose the
hours of day in which to drive and must decide
when to expose themselves and their equipment to
roadway risks.  Knowing the likelihood that an
accident of a given severity will occur might help
them make more informed decisions.  This work
draws from FMCSA data to explore whether fatal,
injury, or property only crashes are more likely to
happen during the daylight or night and weekday or
weekend.  Conclusions are supported using the
odds ratio, a technique advocated by Knipling
(2009), to assess the likelihood a given risk will
result in certain outcomes.
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
FMCSA was established within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) on January 1, 2000
(FMCSA, 2014). At that time, the FMCSA was
tasked with commercial driver licensing, data and
analysis, regulatory compliance and enforcement,
research, technology, and safety assistance
activities. Ultimately, the FMCSA’s stated mission is
to prevent commercial motor vehicle related
fatalities and injuries (FMCSA, 2014).  In an effort
to educate the public, the FMCSA has published
the Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts (LTBCF)
analysis annually since 2010. LTBCF compiles
descriptive statistics pertaining to truck crashes of
different severities and draws from four major
sources of information: NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS), NHTSA’s General
Estimates System (GES), FMCSA’s Motor Carrier
Management Information System (MCMIS), and
Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) highway
statistics (FMCSA, 2017). This study utilizes
LTBCF data from 2011 – 2015, which is the most
recent year available.  FMCSA requires accidents
to be reported that involve a truck, bus, or any
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vehicle displaying a hazardous materials placard, if
one of these vehicles was involved in a crash while
operating on a roadway customarily open to the
public, or if the accident resulted in fatality, injury or
tow-away (FMCSA, 2015).  When attempting to
understand why these accidents occur and how to
prevent them one must first understand when they
occur.  LTBCF data from 2015 are provided in
Tables 1 and 2 below as an example.   The
information contained in Table 1 provides a
comparison of the time of day in which accidents
occurred and the severity of those accidents.
Table 1 demonstrates that fatal, injury, and property
damage only accident rates are not uniformly
distributed throughout the day.  Rather, the
occurrence of each type of accident is more or less
normally distributed with the majority occurring
between peak driving hours of 6AM and 6PM.
Each year from 2011-2015 exhibited similar
characteristics.  Table 2 compares days of the week
in which accidents occurred and the severity of
those accidents.
Table 2 demonstrates that accident rates are not
uniformly distributed throughout the week.
Accidents of all severities occur more frequently
during the work week and less frequently on the
weekends. Each year from 2011-2015 exhibited
similar characteristics.
LTBCF data demonstrate a directional difference,
with more of each accident severity category
occurring during daylight hours and during the week.
This would lead one to believe that accidents of any
severity are more likely to occur on weekdays
during daylight hours.    However, this may be
deceiving as it does not control for exposure.  More
people are driving during the day and during
weekdays. More accidents occur as more people
are driving.  This is true for two basic reasons.
First, as roads become more crowded, more
vehicles are compressed into a given space.  As
compression increases, proximity between vehicles
decreases, and the chance of contact between
vehicles increases.  Second, each driver has a given
risk of being involved in an accident based on skill,
mechanical factors, and other issues.  For example,
driver skill and accident risk would be inversely
proportional.  Even the most skilled drivers with the
most mechanically sound vehicles bear some
accident risk.  As more people drive, more
accidents will occur due to exposure to the accident
risks of all drivers with whom the road is shared.
Therefore, more people on the road leads to more
accidents due to 1) greater compression and 2)
more driving participants, which leads to more
accidents due to exposure.
Vol. 28 No. 2
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Focusing on fatal accidents in 2015, Table 1
indicates that 2,342 fatal accidents occurred in the
daytime compared to 1,256 at night. However,
more daytime traffic engenders more accidents.
The question remains, if you are involved in an
accident, is this accident more likely to be fatal
(injury, or property damage only) during the day or
night?  To answer this question, we must control for
exposure.
Optimally, we would control for exposure by
comparing the number of accidents per million miles
driven (for example) on each day of the week/at
each time of day.  LTBCF does not provide this
data.  Given this, we chose to control for exposure
by comparing a) the percentage of daytime fatal
(injury, property damage only) accidents as a
percentage of total daytime accidents to b) the
percentage of nighttime fatal (injury, property
damage only) accidents as a percentage of total
nighttime accidents.  Given that more of all accident
types occur in daytime, comparing percentages
affords a standardized measure to determine
whether the likelihood of a fatal (injury, property
damage only) accident is greater in day or night.
Summing all accident severity types in Table 1
across all daytime hours reveals 334,342 total
daytime accidents; 2,342 of which were fatal (7%).
Following the same procedure for nighttime crashes
reveals 80,256 nighttime crashes; 1,250 of which
were fatal (16%).  Percentages were derived in a
similar fashion for daytime and nighttime injury and
property damage only crashes as well as weekday
v. weekend fatal, injury, and property only
accidents.
Percentages from 2011 – 2015 were combined,
coded, and analyzed using ANOVA to determine if
significant differences exist in the number of fatal,
injury, and property only accidents that occur in the
day v. night.  Observations were coded as DAY if
the accident occurred from 6AM – 6PM.
Observations were coded as NIGHT if the accident
occurred from 6PM – 6AM.  This yielded a total of
20 DAY and 20 NIGHT observations (n = 40) for
each accident severity type.  Results for time of day
x accident severity type are presented in Table 3.
Results indicate significant differences for all three
types of crash severity.  The mean column
represents the percentage of all crashes during that
time period that resulted in a given crash severity
outcome.  Of all the nighttime crashes, 2.16%
resulted in a fatality. Fatal crashes make up a
significantly larger percentage of all nighttime
crashes than they do daytime crashes.  (F = 42.317;
p £ 0.01).  Of all the nighttime crashes, 24.20%
resulted in injury.  Injury crashes comprise a
significantly larger percentage of all nighttime
crashes than they do daytime crashes (F = 11.135;
p £ 0.01).  Of all daytime crashes, 78.48% result in
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property damage only.  Property damage only
crashes make up a significantly larger percentage of
all daytime crashes than they do nighttime crashes
(F = 16.520; p £ 0.01).
__________________________________________________________
Following the same procedure utilized in the day v.
night comparison, percentages for 2011 – 2015
were combined, coded, and analyzed using
ANOVA to determine if significant differences exist
in the number of fatal, injury, and property only
accidents that occur on weekdays v. weekends.
Observations were coded as WEEKDAY if the
accident occurred from Monday to Friday.
Observations were coded as WEEKEND if the
accident occurred from Saturday – Sunday.  This
yielded a total of 25 WEEKDAY and 10
WEEKEND observations (n = 35) for each
accident severity type.  Results for day of the week
x accident severity type are presented in Table 4.
Results indicate significant differences across all
three types of crash severity.  Of all the weekend
accidents, 1.49% resulted in fatality.  Fatal accidents
make up a significantly larger percentage of all
weekend accidents than they do weekday accidents
(F = 47.528; p £  0.01).  Of all the weekend
accidents, 23.94% result in injury.  Injury crashes
comprise a significantly larger percentage of all
weekend accidents than they do weekday accidents
(F = 8.112; p £ 0.01).  Of all the weekday crashes,
78.15% result in property damage only.  Property
damage only crashes comprise a larger percentage
of all weekday crashes than they do weekend
crashes (F = 10.082; p £ 0.01).
Given the small sample size utilized in the analyses
presented heretofore, we utilized the odds ratio
technique to further support our findings.  Knipling
(2009, p. 50) advocates the use of odds ratios and
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describes them as, “…a derived statistic that
estimates the relative risks of a crash [severity type]
based on some other factor of interest [day v. night
or weekday v. weekend].”
Knipling (2009, p. 50) provides an example of an
odds ratio in use.  Suppose a motor carrier with
100 drivers wishes to determine the impact of sleep
apnea on accident frequency.  Over a period of
time, 11 company drivers were involved in
accidents.  Out of these 11 drivers it was
determined that 6 had sleep apnea and 5 did not.
Computing the odds ratio of crash involvement in
this scenario requires comparing the odds of being
in a crash for those who have sleep apnea to those
who do not.  The company is said to have 26
drivers with sleep apnea, 6 of whom were involved
in an accident.  This leaves 74 drivers without sleep
apnea, 5 of whom were involved in an accident.
Knipling (2009) structures the aforementioned
scenario as follows:
Sleep apnea odds ratio =  6/20  =  0.30   =  4.1
                                            5/69      0.07
In this example, the odds of an accident given that a
driver has sleep apnea is 4.1.  Values greater than
1.0 indicate greater risk is associated with the
factor.  Values less than 1.0 indicate less risk
associated with the factor.  Greater deviations from
1.0 indicate more/less risk.
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that accidents are more
likely to be fatal or injurious on nights and
weekends.  Therefore, we placed night and
weekend data in the numerator indicating it is the
risk factor for which the odds ratio is quantifying.
The odds ratio calculation for 2015 weekend v.
2015 Weekend v. Weekday Fatal Accident
=  Total Fatal Weekend Accidents/(Total Weekend Accidents – Total Fatal Weekend Accidents)
    Total Fatal Weekday Accidents/(Total Weekday Accidents – Total Fatal Weekday Accidents)
=     598/(47,598 – 598)        =    1.54
    3,000/(367,000 – 3,000)
weekday fatal crashes is provided below as an
example.
Results for 2011 – 2015 are presented in Table 5.
Results presented in Table 5 indicate that fatal
accidents are more likely to occur on nights and
weekends for each year from 2011 – 2015.  Injury
accidents were more likely to occur on nights and
weekends in 2015, 2013, and 2012 as well as
weekends in 2011.  Injury accidents were less likely
to occur on nights and weekends in 2014 and less
likely to occur on nights in 2011.  Property damage
was less likely to occur on nights and weekends in
2015, 2013, 2012, and 2011.  Property damage
was more likely to occur on nights and weekends in
2014.
IMPLICATIONS
Results presented in this study indicate statistically
significant differences between the likelihood of
different accident severities across nights v. days
and weekends v. weekdays as a function of the total
accidents that occur in each time period.  As a
percentage of total accidents during a respective
time period, accidents involving a fatality or injury
are more likely to occur on nights and weekends.
Accidents involving property damage only are more
likely to occur on days and weekdays. These results
may have important managerial implications.
Roadway traffic congestion is greatest during
weekday daylight hours and especially in peak, rush
hour drive time (ATRI, 2014). Over the road
commercial motor vehicles are often compensated
on a per mile basis.  Congestion reduces the number
of miles a truck can travel in a given period of time.
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Sharing the road with fewer drivers is also
perceived to improve safety.  Therefore, drivers’
common sense often dictates a preference to
operate on nights and weekends in the interest of
maximizing compensation and perceived safety
performance.
Raw FMCSA data demonstrate that a larger
number of accidents, regardless of severity, occur
on weekday days.  A disproportionate number of
these accidents result in property damage without
injury or fatality.  However, outcomes differ when
controlling for exposure (e.g. the total number of
accidents).  In this context, our results indicate that
accidents occurring at night or on weekends are
significantly more likely to result in death or injury
compared to accidents that occur during the day.
Accidents occurring during the day or on weekdays
are significantly more likely to result in property
damage only.
Counterintuitively, traffic congestion may actually
reduce accident severity.  Newton’s second law
states that force is a function of mass and
acceleration.  Force increases as the speed of an
object with a given mass increases.  Greater force
increases accident severity.  Congestion slows traffic
(ATRI, 2014) and, therefore, reduces the force
involved in accidents that occur.  Therefore,
congestion may also reduce accident severity during
day and weekdays as demonstrated in our study.
Decreased congestion allows trucks to travel at
higher average speeds.  Higher speeds allow trucks
to increase daily revenue.  However, should an
accident occur, higher speeds increase accident
severity.  Increased speed may contribute to the
increased severity of night and weekend accidents.
The population of inebriated drivers also increases
on nights and weekends.  Commercial truck drivers
are not often found to be under the influence of
alcohol when a fatal accident occurs.  NHTSA
reported that 2.7% of commercial truck fatal
crashes involved alcohol use by the truck driver.
Car drivers were impaired by alcohol in 27% of
fatal light vehicle crashes (NHTSA, 2017).  Blower
(1998) studied driver error in accidents involving
cars and large trucks.  Results indicate that the car
driver was at fault in 71% of accidents.  The
increased presence of impaired car drivers during
night and weekend hours likely increases truck
accident severity.
Drivers should consider these results when planning
their trips.  Drivers should not take advantage of
decreased congestion and travel at unsafe speeds.
Caution should be taken to maintain speeds that are
safe for conditions. Drivers should also more
carefully weigh the tradeoffs of exposure as it relates
to day v night and weekday v. weekend driving.
Reduced congestion inherent to night and weekend
driving increases profitability, but there is also a
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significantly increased risk of fatal or injurious
accident during these times when compared to days
and weekdays.
Safety managers should also consider exposure
when setting company policy.  Any safety incident is
detrimental.  However, insurance carriers often
dictate safety managers reduce certain types of
incidents (e.g. property damage, injury only, or
catastrophic fatality losses).  Safety managers may
use the principals of exposure explained heretofore
as a lever to influence safety outcomes.  Given an
overabundance of past property damage or injury
only incidents, safety managers may wish to control
for excess exposure to other vehicles and encourage
drivers to operate at night or on weekends.
However, if faced with the need to reduce
catastrophic losses, safety managers may encourage
drivers to operate during the day or on weekdays.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study is faced with several limitations.  First,
real-time information cannot be gleaned from the
FMCSA LTBCF data due to the two-year delay in
its release. However, given the relative stability of
accident severity odds ratios presented in Table 5, it
is likely that our findings remain applicable today.
Next, secondary data was used in this study. The
validity of our results is subject to the practices of
those who collect and code the LTBCF data.
Finally, small sample sizes employed in our analysis
inhibit generalizability. Future investigations should
seek to collect more data or obtain larger datasets.
Future investigations should also uncover reasons
behind increased night and weekend accident
severity.  We posit that increased speed and
impaired light vehicle drivers play a significant role.
However, LTBCF data do not contain information
that would allow us to substantiate this theory.
Data limitations also prevented the examination of
covariates.  Our results would imply that accidents
are most severe on weekend nights.  Future
research should examine this possibility.
Motor carrier safety research is relatively lacking in
the business logistics literature. The large volume of
available, secondary data makes this a potentially
fruitful area for further inquiry.  Researchers wishing
to collect primary data may wish to define a new
“driver deviance” construct and assess its impact on
safety performance.  Deviant behavior (e.g. such as
speeding, poor maintenance practices, and log book
violations) have been shown to influence safety
outcomes.  This research should seek to uncover
characteristics of drivers that are more likely to
result in bad behavior, and how these drivers can be
avoided in the hiring process.
CONCLUSIONS
Safety is of paramount importance to motor carrier
operations.  However, safety is multi-faceted and
not easily achieved. Drivers must operate in a safe
manner.  Management must put drivers in a position
to operate safely by, for instance, scheduling
delivery appointments that can be legally achieved in
accordance with posted speed limits and Federal
HOS regulations.  Drivers must also be aware and
wary of those with whom they share the road.
Our results demonstrate that safety outcomes differ
by time of day and day of the week.  However, the
clock and calendar do not determine roadway
safety.  Safety outcomes are primarily determined
by human choices.  These choices differ by the
temporal factors examined herein. These temporal
factors are but a small subset of those contributing
to the thousands of deaths that occur annually on
American roads.  Safety is a shared responsibility
and one that is equally important at every hour on
every day.
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